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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below.

Respondent, City of Plummer ("City") agrees with Hayes' recitation of the nature
of the case and the course of proceedings below. 1
B.

Statement of Facts.

In October, 1976, the Western Benewah School District ("School District")
deeded to the City a parcel of land located on the comer of Elm Street and 13 th Street in
Plummer, Idaho, more commonly known as the Plummer City Park or the Plummer
football field ("Park"). In 1976, the City applied for federal funding from the Land and
Water Conservation Fund. The City sought the grant for the purpose of establishing and
developing a public outdoor recreation park. R. Vol. I, pp. 72, 127, 137-13. The federal
grant money received by the City was used primarily for the development of an "outdoor
recreation facility for general outdoor recreation use," including the development of
tennis courts, basketball courts, landscaping, horseshoe pits, picnic facilities, softball
diamonds and parking at the dedicated park site. R. Vol. I, pp. 148-155. The City
continues to hold title to the property in fee simple. R. Vol. I, p. 72.
The Park is open to the general public for sporting events, such as football games,
picnics, dog walking, and other recreational activities. R. Vol. L p. 61; Deposition of
Sounder, pp. 62, l. 25; 63, fl. 1-22. The Park and its playing fields are open to the general
public and other community groups for use at no charge. R. Vol. I, pp. 63-65. The
primary purpose of the Park is for recreation by the general public.

All outdoor

recreation facilities on site are open and available for general public use, without fee or
1 Defendants Worley School District #44 and Accelerated Construction and Excavation, LLC
were dismissed from this action by stipulation and are not part of this appeal. The PlummerWorley School District is the successor to the Western Benewah School District.

charge to the public. Id. The Park's gate is continually open to the public and the public
is invited to use the Park at any time for recreational purposes.

R. Vol. I, p. 61;

deposition of Sounder, pp. 62, l. 25; 63, fl. 1-2]
Stacey Sounder is the maintenance director for the School District and has served
in that position for over twelve (12) years. Mr. Sounder testified that the Park is a public
place that is open to the general public for recreational purposes, free of charge. Mr.
Sounder testified as follows:
Q: You testified earlier that the field is open to everybody.
Sounder: Yes.
Q: Is that the Case?
Sounder: Yes.
Q: How do you know that?
Sounder: Everybody uses it. You see everybody up there. It's
community property.
Q: And do they use it for recreation?
Sounder: Yes.
Q: What kind of recreation have you seen it being used for?
Sounder: People go up and play baseball. They play soccer on it.
They have community activities, like I was just saying. They bring
their dogs up there and throw Frisbees. Some of the teenage kids
will come out and they'll play, you know, tag football. A lot of
people use it.
Q: Okay. And does anybody charge them to use it?
Sounder: No.
Q: It's free for anybody to use?
Sounder: Yes.

R. Vol. I, p. 61; Deposition of Sounder, pp. 62, l. 25; 63, fl. 1-22.
Q: So as I understand it, is it your testimony that anybody can use
that field for recreational purposes?
Sounder: Yes.
Q: And do they?
Sounder: Yes.
Q: Without charge?
Sounder: Yes.

R. Vol. l p. 62; Deposition of Sounder, p. 65, ll. 2-9.
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Q: In terms of use of that field, organized activities have to go
through the school district; is that right?
Sounder: Yes
Q: But if some neighborhood kids come over and they want to
play some Frisbee or some flag football, they just do it, is that
right?
Sounder: Correct.
Q: Is that how it works?
Sounder: Correct.

R. Vol. I, p. 62; Deposition of Sounder, pp. 68, fl. 24-25; 69, fl. 1-5.
The School District has a school building that is located adjacent to the Park and
uses the Park and its playing fields for football games and other school organized
activities. R. Vol. I, pp. 63-65. The School District does not pay a fee to the City for use
of the football fields. Id. The School District maintains the playing field and pays the
City for water and for the electrical utilities associated with the Park, however the
primary purpose of the Park is for outdoor recreational use by the public. Id. The School
District is responsible for scheduling organized events, games and activities at the park
for the general public. R. Vol. I,pp. 75, fl. 14-25; 76, fl.1-I6; 90, fl. 16-25; 91, fl. 1-12.
On September 17, 2011, Martin Hayes attended a Pop Warner football game at
the Park.

The School District was responsible for scheduling the organized event.

Although the School District scheduled the Pop Warner football game, the game was not
sponsored or promoted by the School District or the City. R. Vol. I, p. 61; Deposition of

Sounder, p. 65, fl. 6-20.

Instead, it was an event that was organized through a

collaboration of the community and the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. Stacy Sounder testified
concerning the nature of the football game as follows:
Q: It's [the Park] free for anybody to use?
Sounder: Yes.
Q: Pop Warner football?
Sounder: Yes.
3

Q: Is Pop Warner football a school district program?
Sounder: No.
Q: It's a private program?
Sounder: It is a collaboration with the community and the Coeur
d'Alene tribe.
Q: So this- the event that had occurred on the Saturday where you
learned about the man being injured, was that a Pop Warner game?
Sounder: Yes.

R. Vol. 1, p. 62; Deposition of Sounder, pp. 63, fl. 23-25; 64, fl. 1-9.

Q: Did you know what was going on there that day?
Sounder: I knew there was a football game.
Q: Did you know who had sponsored it?
Sounder: Yes.
Q: How did you know that?
Sounder: Because it's every year. The tribe puts on that Pop
Warner program every year. It's been that way for ten years
probably now.
Q: The school district has a football team also?
Sounder: Yes.
Q: And it was not the school district's football game?
Sounder: No.

R. Vol. l p. 61; Deposition ofSounder, p. 65, ll. 6-20.
In July of 2011, the School District hired Accelerated Constrnction and
Excavation, LLC to build new bleachers for the playing field. R. Vol. 1, pp. 63-65 On
September 17, 2011, Mr. Hayes and his wife were spectators at their grandson's Pop
Warner football game. Hayes claims that he was injured when he tripped and fell over
uneven ground that was caused by earlier constrnction on the field. Hayes claims that the
constrnction process by Accelerated resulted in the creation of deep tire tracks and
uneven ground, which were not remedied prior to opening the premises to guests. R. Vol.

1, pp. 8-12.
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II. ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review.

The City agrees that Hayes has correctly stated the standard of review as de novo.
The Supreme Court reviews a ruling on summary judgment under the same standard as
the district court. Gracie, LLC v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n., 149 Idaho 570,237 P.3d
1196 (2010).
B.

Immunitv Under Idaho's Recreational Use Statute.

The purpose of Idaho's recreational use statute is to "encourage owners of land to
make land and water areas available to the public without charge for recreational
purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes."
Idaho Code§ 36-1604(a). Idaho Code§ 36-1604(b)(4) defines "recreational purposes" to
include athletic competition, when done without charge of the owner. The statute further
provides, in relevant part, that "[a]n owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the
premises safe for entry by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a
dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for
such purposes." Idaho Code § 36-1604(c). Idaho Code § 36-1604 applies to public
entities. See McGhee v. City of Glenns Ferry, 111 Idaho 921, 922, 729 P.2d 396, 397
(1986); Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266,269, 766 P.2d 736, 739 (1988). A
public entity is a landowner under the terms of the statute and thereby "owes no duty of
care to keep the premises safe for entry by others for recreational purposes, or to give
warning of a dangerous condition." See Idaho Code§§ 36-1604(b)(2) and 36-1604(c).
The statute does not confer absolute immunity upon owners who gratuitously
permit recreational use of their property. A landowner who permits a person to enter or

5

go upon the land without charge for a recreational purpose owes that person the same
duty as owed by the landowner to a trespasser. Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho
at 270. That duty is simply to refrain from willful or wanton acts which might cause
mJury. Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537,960 P.2d 1266 (1998). Therefore, a land
owner who directly or indirectly invites or permits a person to use his or her property for
recreational purposes without charge does not "confer upon such person the legal status
of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed." Idaho Code § 36-1604( d)(2).

1.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Found That \Vorley School
District Was Permitted to Use the City Park Without Charge.

Hayes argue on appeal that the City is not entitled to immunity under Idaho Code
§ 36-1064 because the School District maintained the grounds and paid for the electrical
utilities associated with the Park. The City does not forfeit its immunity simply because
the School District applies fertilizer to the fields, mows the lawn, maintains the turf, or
pays for the Park's lighting.
Idaho Code § 36-1604 does not define the term "charge," however, "there can be
no doubt that the legislature intended the term 'charge' to mean a consideration given in
return for the express and direct privilege of being allowed to utilize the property, in
money or other thing of value." See Albertson v. Freemont County, 834 F. Supp.2d 1117,
1131 (D. Idaho, 2011 ). Recreational use statutes similar to Idaho Code § 36- 1604 have
been the focus of much litigation, where often the issue is whether compensation or
consideration was paid for the use of the land. Traditionally, Idaho courts have extended
immunity to land owners who open their property to others on a gratuitous basis, as apart
from those whose land is open for business reasons. See Albertson, supra; Allen v. State,
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136 Idaho 487, 36 P.3d 1275 (Idaho, 2001); Corey v. State, 108 Idaho 921, 703 P.2d 685
(Idaho 1985); ; Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504 (9 th Cir. 1983).
In Albertson v. Fremont County, immunity was extended where maintenance
costs and fees were allocated to the property owner from money received through
mandatory snowmobile registration fees.

834 F.Supp. 2d at 1131.

In Albertson, the

Court engaged in an in-depth analysis regarding the meaning and legislative intent
underlying the term "charge" under the Idaho recreational use statute, Idaho Code § 361604. The Albertson Court first analyzed the holding in Allen v. State, 136 Idaho 487, 36
P.3d 1275 (Idaho, 2001), wherein a father and son went to an Idaho state park to fish.
While fishing, the child fell into the lake and impaled his leg on a steel fence post under
the water. Id. at 1276. Prior to entering the state park, the father and son paid a two
dollar vehicle entrance fee to use the park. Id. The district court held that the State was
immune from liability under Idaho Code § 36-1604. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the two dollar entrance fee constituted a charge within the meaning of the
recreational use statute and that the State could not, therefore, assert immunity under that
statute. Id.
Next, the Albertson Court analyzed the holding in Corey v. State, 108 Idaho 921,
703 P.2d 685 (Idaho 1985), looking for more guidance regarding the legislative purpose
behind the word "charge" found in Idaho Code § 36-1604( d). In Corey, a snowmobiler
sued the state for damages arising from a snowmobile accident that occurred on State
ground. In that case, the snowmobiler was injured when he struck a cable strung across a
path in an Idaho state park. Id. at 922. The plaintiff argued that the State was negligent
in placing the cable across the path. Id. The issue before the Court in that case was
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whether the State's conduct was "intentional or willful," providing an exception to
immunity under the Idaho recreational use statute. Id. at 923. Although the Court did not
address the issue of whether the plaintiff was charged to use the park, the Court looked to
the underlying decision issued at the district court level to aide in its interpretation of §
36-1604. See Albertson, 834 F.Supp 2d at I 131. The district court in Corey found that a
snowmobile registration fee did not constitute a charge under the recreational use statute,
reasoning: "There can be no doubt that the legislature intended the term "charge" to mean
a consideration given in return for the express and direct privilege of being allowed to
utilize the property, in money or other thing of value. " See Albertson v. Freemon!

County, 834 F. Supp.2d at 1131; citing Corey v. State, Case No. 57158 (First Dist.,
Kootenai County, Mem. Opinion, May 23, 1984).
The Albertson Court then looked to other federal and state cases interpreting state
recreational use statutes like Idaho Code § 36-1604, in which the courts have held a
"charge" must be for entry onto the land. See Albertson, 834 F.Supp. 2d. at I 13 I; citing

Howard v. US., 181 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying Hawaii statute); Jones v.
U.S., 693 F.2d 1299, 1300 (9th Cir. 1982) (fee charged by government concessionaire for
use of an inner tube not a fee for use of recreational facilities under Washington State
recreational use statute); Zuk v. US., 698 F.Supp. 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Miller v.

Weitzen, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 73, 133 Cal.App.4th 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). The Albertson
Court further found persuasive the Court's statement in Allen v. State, supra, in which the
Court stated that "[ w ]e find no provision in the recreational use act ... that conditions the
landowner's protection from liability upon the use to which the landowner puts the money
received from a recreational user.... The fact that a portion of the fee charged may have
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been intended by the State for the upkeep of the Park, its roads, or the parking lot, is
irrelevant." 36 P.3d at 1277.
The Albertson Court went on to apply the above cited rulings to the facts of the
case before it. In that case, Albertson sustained fatal injuries while snowmobiling on a
groomed trail located in the Caribou-Targhee Forest, Fremont County, Idaho.
1119.

Id. at

Plaintiffs sued Fremont County and the United States of America ("U.s'') for

wrongful death and negligence in maintaining the snowmobile trail in a reasonable safe
condition. Id. The U.S. was the owner of the land and moved for summary judgment
under Idaho Code§ 36-1604. Id. at 1129. Plaintiffs argued that summary judgment was
not appropriate and that the U.S. was not immune from liability under Idaho Code § 361604 because Albertson had paid a snowmobile registration fee pursuant to a cost-share
agreement between the U.S. and the Idaho Department of Recreation.

Id.

Plaintiffs

argued that the registration fee constituted a "charge" and therefore immunity didn't
apply. Id. at 1131. The Albertson Court disagreed. The Court found that Albertson was
not charged a fee for use or entry onto the snowmobile trail, and therefore following the
reasoning outlined by the Allen Court, the United States had established all of the
conditions for immunity contained in the Idaho recreational use statute, Idaho Code § 361604. Id. at 1132.
The obvious purpose of recreational use immunity is to limit the liability of those
who allow others onto their property as a public service, not to provide immunity to those
who provide recreational activities for commercial gain. The City allows the public onto
its property as a public service to the Plummer community, including the School District
and the Pop Warner athletic program. Appellants claim that the City is not entitled to
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immunity because the School District "controls" access to the Park and the community's
use of the Park for organized activities. That claim is inaccurate. Although the School
District schedules the organized events that occur on the Park fields, the Park's gate is
open at all times for public entrance. R. Vol. I, p. 79, ll. I 5-17. The Park is open to the
community for recreational activities, such as ball games, soccer games, picnicking, dog
walking and Frisbee throwing, all free of charge. R. Vol. L p. 61; Deposition of Sounder,
pp. 62, l. 25; 63, ll. 1-22; R. Vol. I, p. 79; Deposition of Sharrett, p. 18, fl. 15-1.
There is no dispute that the City owns the land upon which the School District
holds its football games during the school year. The School District does not own the
football field and access to the football field by private organizations and citizens is not
prohibited. There is also no dispute that spectators and players are allowed onto the
property, at no charge, for the purpose of watching and engaging in recreational
activities. R. Vol. I, p. 63-65. The City receives no monetary compensation from the
School District or the public for admittance to the park or scheduled athletic events. The
School District is not charged for "entry" onto the City's land and the School District
does not pay the water and electrical utilities in exchange for recreational use of the
property.
Under the reasoning and rationale of Albertson, supra, the district court did not
err m finding that the City is entitled to immunity.

The undertaking of certain

obligations, such as the care and maintenance of the football turf and park lawns, is not
"given in return for the express and direct privilege of being allowed to utilized the
property." See Albertson, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. Contrary to the Hayes' argument, the

10

maintenance and upkeep of the City fields does not fall within the meaning of "charge"
or "compensation" as found in Idaho's Recreational Use Statute.

2.

The City Park is Open to the Public and Is Not Under the
Control of the School District.

The crux of Hayes' argument under this section is that because the School District
scheduled all organized sporting events on the playing field, the City forfeits immunity
under the Idaho recreational use statute. Hayes assert that immunity doesn't apply to the
City because Mr. Hayes was injured during an event that was scheduled through the
School District. Hayes further assert that because the School District maintained control
over the scheduling of events, the Pop Warner football game fell within the "scope" of
the School District's use of the Park and the City is therefore liable for Mr. Hayes'
injuries. Hayes' argument is tenuous at best.
The School District does not "control" access to the Park or oversee public
activity within the Park. Superintendant of the Plummer-Worley School District, Judi
Sharrett testified:
Q: Other than school activities, does the school district oversee
activities that might be scheduled, say, to the general public.
Sharrett: We don't oversee them.

R. Vol. I, p. 77; Deposition of Sharrett; p. 15, ll. 11-14.
The Park is open to the public for recreational purposes at no charge. The School
District merely schedules sporting events for both the School District and public so that
an organization or private group can use the field at a scheduled date and time without
conflict. Organizations and private groups who want to use the field must fill out a
"facility use form" with the school district in order to reserve the playing fields for their
group or activity. Judi Sharrett testified regarding the scheduling of events as follows:
11

Q: Let me talk a minute or ask for a minute about the use of this
football field. Is it open to the public?
Sharrett: A person would have to - or an organization would
have to fill out a facility use form in order to be able to utilize that.
Q: ... describe this facility use form. What is it?
Sharrett: Well, it's a-if a - if an activity needs to happy (sic.) or
if an organization or private group wants to use something as - that
the school district utilizes-you know, owns or utilizes--- and the
football field would be one of those-they would fill out a facility
use agreement form and have to show proof of insurance and get
permission-basically to look and see if the scheduling will work.
R. Vol. I, p. 75; Deposition of Sharrett, pp. 11, ll. 14-25; 12, ll. 1-6.
Stacey Sounder further explained during his deposition testimony:
Sounder: There's a form at the district office that you must fill
out, and the form you must - you got to fill out the date that you
want to use it, the time. Because there's other games going on like
middle school football games, high school football games, Pop
Warner football. And then the community, you know, they always
want to schedule in stuff too, so you usually go through the district
office to fill that out.

R. Vol. L p. 91; Deposition of Sounder, p. 20, ll. 4-12.
The Pop Warner football game is the perfect example of this. The game is not a
City sponsored event nor a School District sponsored event. It is a community event that
has occurred each year, for the past ten years, and is a collaborated effort between the
Plummer community and the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.

R. Vol. I, p. 62; Deposition of

Sounder, pp. 63, ll. 23-25; 64, ll. 1-9. Every year it is scheduled through the School
District, as are all other publicly organized recreational activities, for the purpose of
ensuring that the Pop Warner football game and other public events and park activities
don't conflict.

There is no charge to the participants of the Pop Warner football

organization, or to other community organizations, for their use of the field and the City
does not charge a fee to the spectators who came out to watch these events.
12

The Pop Warner football game was not a school activity and therefore could not
fall under the "scope" of the School District's use. Hayes have cited to no legal authority
to support their argument that simply because a third party organizes and schedules
events on land that is set aside for public use, that the landowner forfeits immunity under
the Idaho recreational use statute. The district court properly granted summary judgment
to the City.
3.

The City is Immune From Liability Because Mr. Hayes Was Not
Charged for His Use of the Park (Open to Public Use).

To be entitled to immunity under Idaho Code § 36-1604, the City must have
permitted Mr. Hayes to enter onto the City's property "without charge" and for
"recreational purposes." In this matter, it is undisputed that the City did not charge Mr.
Hayes, or any other "person," for admittance into the Park when he attended his
grandson's football game. It is also undisputed that Mr. Hayes' attendance at the football
games falls within the meaning of "recreational purposes" under Idaho Code § 36-1604.
Hayes assert that the underlying policy and proper analysis of immunity under
Idaho Code § 36-1604 focuses upon whether the landowner charged or received
compensation for use of the land, regardless of who provided the compensation. Hayes
cite to Twohig v. US, 711 F. Supp 560 (D. Mont. 1998) and Ducey v. United States, 713
F. 2d 504 (9 th Cir. 1983) as persuasive case law for this matter. The City acknowledges
that the Ducey court and the Twohig court both indicated in its analysis that
"consideration need not come from the ultimate user, but it must be paid by someone so
as to create access to the premises." Twohig, 711 F. Supp at 564; See also Ducey, 713
F.2d at 514. However, the underlying holding in both cases focuses upon whether or not
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the land owner derived an economic benefit from allowing others to use his land for
recreational purposes, or whether the land was gratuitously open to the public.
Under the reasoning and rationale of either the Ducey or the Twohig cases, the
City is immune from liability because it gratuitously opened the Park to the public for
recreational purposes. In Twohig, the Montana court applied the Idaho recreational use
statute to a claim arising out of the deaths of three individuals who died at the Lolo Pass
Winter Sports Area. Twohig, 711 F. Supp at 561. The decedents had purchased a Park n'
Ski permit, required for use of the area if a vehicle was parked in the area parking lot. Id.
at 562. The fee was charged for recreational purposes at the Lolo Pass ski area and a
portion of the revenues collected from the Lolo Pass permits were remitted to the United
States. Id. at 563. The court denied immunity under Idaho Code § 36-1604, finding that
the United States had received an economic benefit from the Park n' Ski program in
exchange for allowing the land to be used for recreational purposes. Id. at 564. The
court's holding was based on the rationale that the decedents had not been allowed to
gratuitously use the Lolo Pass ski area and that the United States had received revenue
from the permits, a "charge" under Idaho Code§ 36-1604. Id. at 563.

In Ducey v. United States, 713 F. 2d 504 (9 th Cir. 1983), the court denied
immunity to the United States government, finding that the Government's receipt of a I

¾% of a concessionaire's gross annual receipts at a cafe-store and from boat slip and
trailer space rentals located in a national recreational area owned by the Government
were sufficient to constitute a charge, or "consideration," under the Nevada Recreational
Use Statute. Id. at 507. The 9

th

Circuit differentiated between the entrepreneur-type

landowner, whose land is open for business reasons, from the landowner whom the
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statute encourages to open land on a gratuitous basis by the promise of immunity. Id. at
511. Specifically, the Ducey court stated that "the consideration exception is not simply a
mechanical test to distinguish those recreational use cases that involve direct payment
from user to landowner from those that do not. Rather, it is intended to serve more
broadly as a proxy for differentiating the entrepreneur-landowner whose land is open for
business reasons from the landowner whom the statute encourages to open his land on a
gratuitous basis by the promise of immunity." Id. at 514.
The City is not out for commercial gain, nor does it receive any revenue for
games, activities, or organized events that take place at the Park. As is typical with any
public park, people use the Park for many recreational purposes and community
activities. People run their dogs in the park and throw Frisbees. Teenagers play tag
football. Families picnic in the Park. People play baseball and soccer. The Park's gate is
open at all times for public entrance and anyone can use the Park for recreational
purposes free of charge. [R. Vol. I., p. 62; Deposition of Sounder, pp. 63, ll. 23-25; 64, fl.
1-9; pp. 63-65] When this Court considers the distinction made in Ducey and Twohig and

applies it to the facts in this case, it is clear that the Park is land that is open to the public,
not "open for business," and that the recreational immunity statute applies to the City.

III. CONCLUSION
The district court did not err when it held that the City is protected from liability
under Idaho's recreational land use statute, Idaho Code § 36-1604. Mr. Hayes used the
Park for recreational purposes without charge.

The City does not charge the School

District for its organization and use of the park for public sporting events. The district
court properly dismissed the Hayes' claims in this matter.
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